In diesem Beitrag soll ein Überblick über den Handel von Kreditrisiken gegeben werden. Dazu werden die wichtigsten Instrumente vorgestellt ebenso wie die Entwicklung der zugehörigen Märkte. Die Vertragsgestaltung wird insbesondere aus dem Blickwinkel untersucht, negative Effekte von...

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...

This paper studies the problem of redistribution between individuals having different mortality rates. We use a continuous time model in which there are two types of individuals characterized by different survival probability paths. Individual preferences are represented by a generalized...

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...

Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the...

Governments design taxation schemes to capture resource rent. However, they usually propose contracts with limited duration and possess less information on the resources than the extractive firms do. This paper investigates how information asymmetry on costs and an inability to commit to...