The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an...

This paper models a financial sector in which there is a feedback between individual bank risk and aggregate funding market problems. Greater individual risk taking worsens adverse selection problems on the market. But adverse selection premia on that market push up bank risk taking, leading to...

We offer a rational expectations model of the dynamics of innovative industries. The fundamental value of innovations is uncertain and one must learn whether they are solid or fragile. Also, when the industry is new, it is difficult to monitor managers and make sure they exert the effort...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks’ macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. We develop a set of novel modeling mechanisms through which capital buffers can be allocated...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks' macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. We develop a set of novel modeling mechanisms through which capital buffers can be allocated...