Uncertainty in election outcomes generates politically induced regulatory risk. For monopoly regulation, political parties' risk attitudes towards such risk depend on a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at least one party. Irrespective of the...

This paper considers a market in which only the incumbent's quality is publicly known. The entrant's quality is observed by the incumbent and some fraction of informed consumers. This leads to price signalling rivalry between the duopolists, because the incumbent gains and the entrant loses when...

We develop a measure of static misallocation that separates uncertainty from misallocation generated by tax-like distortions. In the Finnish firm-level data, uncertainty accounts for the majority of ex post misallocation and explains a strong decreasing age-dependent trend in it. To understand...

We show that banks' risk exposure in one asset category affects how they report regulatory risk weights for another asset category. Specifically, banks report lower credit risk weights for their loan portfolio when they face higher risk exposure in their trading book. This relationship is...

Recent contributions have shown that it is possible to account for the so-called consumptionreal exchange anomaly in models with goods market frictions where international asset trade is limited to a riskless bond. In this paper, we consider a more realistic international asset market structure...

Regulatory capital for trading book positions includes two components that cover different risks but apply to the same portfolio, one for market risk and one for credit risk. Similar approaches are common in banks’ internal models for economic capital. Although it is known that joint market...

Our paper addresses firm size as a driver of systematic credit risk in loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Key contributions are the use of a unique data set of SME lending by over 400 German banks and relating systematic risk to the size dependence of regulatory capital requirements....