Similar Search Results

Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

Incentives, project choice and dynamic multitasking

Szydlowski, Martin - 2011

I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for project execution which depends on both a project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008989452

Ambiguity in dynamic contracts

Szydlowski, Martin - 2012

the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where … he receives excessive benefits compared to the contract without ambiguity, while after low performance, he enters the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009427192

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor - 2010

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137464

Stock options and chief executive officer compensation

Armstrong, Christopher (contributor); … - 2007

Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782064

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu - 2010

performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146587