This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market, we are able to obtain credible and precise …

on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to … ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act … one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of …

unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching. …

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

We show that in a search/matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect …

information between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Specifically …A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching … facilitates match formation. -- Matching Markets ; Signaling …

?s. The paper compares the predictions of the signaling and human capital models in response to an exogenous demand shock … hypotheses are derived. The findings suggest that the signaling model may indeed predict the observed changes in the schooling …