We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of inter-firmheterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with freeentry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfectforesight....

We analyze the phenomenon of hub dominance by developing a model relating faresto distance, using the mainleg of intercontinental flights for scaling purposes. Our results indicate thatat least some of the major Europeancarriers place a mark up on flights originating from or going to their hubs.

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

This paper develops a novel theory linking quantity discounts to bargaining power in scenarios where retailers, organized as a trade association, negotiate uniform wholesale prices with suppliers. Our theory predicts that suppliers offer greater quantity discounts in regional markets where they...

This paper investigates the effect of industrial penetration and internet intensity for Taiwan manufacturing firms, and analyses whether the relationships are substitutes or complements. The sample observations are based on 153,081 manufacturing plants, and covers 26 two-digit industry...

We are concerned with trade in transport services (not cabotage butrather international shipping, transport,and related logistical services) and the importance of competitionand market structure in the sector. Weexamine implications of liberalization for profits, trade, andnational gains from...

We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price...