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Performance measure congruity in linear agency models with interactive tasks

Budde, Jörg - 2006 - revised version, November 2006

This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency's total surplus within an linear …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383032

Objective versus subjective performance evaluations

Terstiege, Stefan - 2013

Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective … performance is unknown. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198959

Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers

Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008

We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383017

Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors

Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - 2008

report the agent's performance truthfully, while all others report favorably independent of performance. This implies that … overstated performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of optimal contracts under informational asymmetries. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849

Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems : theory and experimental evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365864

Performance pay and risk aversion

Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868

On delegation under relational contracts

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874

Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

Trade, technologies, and the evolution of corporate governance

Schymik, Jan Simon - 2015

in performance compensation since monitoring managers becomes less efficient. Using data on CEO compensation and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345788