We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a gen-eral equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality placesstrong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compen-sation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with thefact that the bulk of many...

We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position and a variable 'salary'...

We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a general equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality places strong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compensation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many...

Recent studies have found unmeasured intangible capital to be large and important.In this paper we observe that by nature intangible capital is also very different from physical capital. We find it plausible to argue that the accumulation process for intangible capital differs significantly from...

We study the influence of systematic probability misestimation on complexfinancial investment decisions on the context of structured financialproducts. Structured products have in recent years become more and morecomplex. We study the question whether this complexity might be a...

Evolutionary nance studies the dynamic interaction of investment strategies in nancialmarkets. This market interaction generates a stochastic wealth dynamics on aheterogenous population of traders through the uctuation of asset prices and theirrandom payos. Asset prices are endogenously...