Showing 1 - 10 of 26
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135820
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager's employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592
This study addresses the factors that determine the intensity of pay for performance schemes. The results indicate that … the use of individual and group incentives boost intensity, whereas plant or firm pay for performance do not seem to … financial measures are not significant or have a negative effect on the intensity of pay for performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016242
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency … noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels … for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318660
This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314
We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015024
We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on … objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the … experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915743
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314
This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are compensated by positive continuation-value and selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013049077
and cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort task … options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers' performance. We observe that incentive … contracts and implicit costs interact in a non-trivial manner. Performance reacts significantly to changes in implicit effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962308