Similar Search Results

Target Performance Goals in CEO Compensation Contracts and Management Earnings Guidance

Martin, Xiumin - 2018

We study how compensation committees set CEOs' earnings performance goals in annual incentive plans (AIPs) and their … both financial analysts and managers in setting performance goals. Also, the weight boards place on a manager's earnings … when performance goals are linked to earnings-based measures such as Earnings-Per-Share (EPS), but not when they are linked …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934487

Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

The Real Effects of Tournament Incentives : The Case of Firm Innovation

Jia, Ning - 2020

This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other executives, are associated with a higher level of patent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855711

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor - 2010

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137464

Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies

Yang, Nian - 2018

We study optimal effort and compensation in a continuous-time model with three-sided moral hazard and cost synergies. One agent exerts initial effort to start the project; the other two agents exert ongoing effort to manage it. The project generates cash flow at a fixed rate over its lifespan;...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928139

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu - 2010

performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146587