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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

The Peter Principle : An Experiment

Dickinson, David L.; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2021

The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promoted employees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression to the mean of the transitory component of ability. Our experiment reproduces this model in the laboratory by means of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316656

The Spillover Effects of Affirmative Action on Competitiveness and Unethical Behavior

Banerjee, Ritwik - 2017

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to examine various spillover effects of Affirmative Action policies in the context of castes in India. We test a) if individuals who compete in the presence of Affirmative Action policies remain competitive in the same proportion after the policy has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967231

Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176642

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor - 2010

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137464

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu - 2010

performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146587