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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021

the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager's employer. A necessary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592

Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory : An Experimental Study

Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, Mirjam - 2021

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency … noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels … for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318660

Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - 2013

This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082165

Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns : When Equality is Unfair

Abeler, Johannes - 2009

particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158119

Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk - 2007

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314

Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests

Stracke, Rudi - 2014

This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are compensated by positive continuation-value and selection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013049077

Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013

rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830

Feedback in Tournaments Under Commitment Problems : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2021

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316760

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor - 2010

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogeneous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137518

The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes : Evidence from a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian - 2012

Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple … and economically important for performance. We find that higher salience of incentives for quantity increases quantity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107721