This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on...

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G(S,d) is defined that has an infinity of weakly...

Game Theory describes human interaction involving conflict, cooperation and competition, the term Interpersonal Decision Theory is synonymous. The term reflects the fact that most essential features of this field are manifested in parlor games. This topic-level treatment covers large parts of...

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

These notes consist of two parts. In the first one I present a counter example to Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013). In the second part I propose a correction based on an axiom similar to one used by Salonen (1988) in the first axomatization of the Discrete Raiffa solution.