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Executive compensation and stock options : an inconvenient truth
Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B. - 2008
to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-proffile managers' compensation is in the form of various …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961700
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Move a little closer? : information sharing and the spatial clustering of bank branches
Qi, Shusen; Haas, Ralph de; Ongena, Steven; Straetmans, … - 2018 - This version: 27 February 2018
We study how information sharing between banks influences the geographical clustering of branches. A spatial oligopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875705
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Director independence as strategic behavior
Wagner, Alexander F. (contributor) - 2007
This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550804
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Executive compensation : the view from general equilibrium
Danthine, Jean-Pierre (contributor);  … - 2007
firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non … and that maximizing the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensation to … overall economic performance is also required to make sure that managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550864
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Bank bonus pay as a risk sharing contract
Efing, Matthias; Hau, Harald; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2018
We argue that risk sharing motivates the bank-wide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs earnings shocks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011938641
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Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Stulz, René M. - 2009
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003970468
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Former CEO directors : lingering CEOs or valuable resources?
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Minton, Bernadette A.; Pan, Carrie H. - 2010
We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003979500
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The dark side of outside directors : do they quit when they are most needed?
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Low, Angie; Stulz, René M. - 2010
Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation, suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions. The announcement returns to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003979510
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Risk-taking incentives, governance, and losses in the financial crisis
Chesney, Marc; Stromberg, Jacob; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2010
("asset incentives"). This is because leverage, while central to the theory of risk shifting, is not explicitly considered by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003979511
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The executive turnover risk premium
Peters, Florian; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2009
We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, accounting for various other factors, unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961496