In this paper we study the allocation of workers over high and low productivity firms in a labor market with coordination frictions. Specifically, we consider a search model where workers can apply to high and or low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase...

We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...

Using a country-industry panel dataset (EUKLEMS) we uncover a robust empirical regularity, namely that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively smaller in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand the mechanism, we develop a two-sector matching model where...

In this paper we derive a structural measure for labor market density based on the Ellison and Glasear (1997) Index for industry concentration. This labor market density measure serves as a proxy for the number of workers that can reach a certain work area within a reasonal amount of traveling...

This discussion paper has resulted in an article in 'Economica', 2002, 69(273), 21-40.

This paper shows that we can normalize job and worker characteristics so that, without frictions,there exists a linear relationship between wages on the one hand and worker and job type indiceson the other. However, for five European countries and the United States we find strong evidencefor a...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium for a large class of search models with two-sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Besides the well-known congestion externalities, we show that on-the-job search in combination with monopsonistic wage setting without commitment creates a...

We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the microfoundations of the matching function. We emphasize a coordination failure caused by multiple applications, namely, that firms can waste resources processing applicants who are ultimately hired elsewhere.

Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In citiessingles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are thereforeprepared to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, themarriage market benefits disappear while the housing...

Is moving to the countryside a credible commitment device for couples? Weinvestigate whether lowering the arrival rate of potential alternative partners bymoving to a less populated area lowers the dissolution risk for a sample of Danishcouples. We find that of the couples who married in the...