This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'SIAM Journal on Optimization', 2006, 16, 854-870. <P> It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping fi from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one...</p>

It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping fi from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image fi(x) has a nonempty intersection with the normal...

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players arerandomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder.Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual realeffort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two...

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players are randomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder. Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual real effort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of...

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set of admissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it cannot be guaranteed...

Any function from a non-empty polytope into itself that is locally gross direction preserving is shown to have the fixed point property. Brouwer's fixed point theorem for continuous functions is a special case. We discuss the application of the result in the area of non-cooperative game theory.