Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Education is argued to be an important driver of the decision to start a business. The measurement of its influence, however, is difficult since it is considered to be an endogenous variable. This study accounts for this endogeneity by using an instrumental variables approach
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513229
Education is a well-known driver of (entrepreneurial) income. The measurement of its influence, however, suffers from endogeneity suspicion. For instance, ability and occupational choice are mentioned as driving both the level of (entrepreneurial) income and of education. Using instrumental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838535
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Small Business Journal' (2013). Volume 31, issue 1, pages 23-33.<P> Education is argued to be an important driver of the decision to start a business. The measurement of its influence, however, is difficult since it is considered...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257474
See also 'Are Education and Entrepreneurial Income Endogenous?' in <I>Entrepreneurship Research Journal</I> (2012), 2(3), 1-27.<P> Education is a well-known driver of (entrepreneurial) income. The measurement of its influence, however, suffers from endogeneity suspicion. For instance, ability and...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257490
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136893
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In- cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137200
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256887