In a competitive managerial labor market, compensation contracts should not depend on public attitudes or social norms regarding income inequality or "fair pay". In contrast to the standard view of optimal incentive design, we find that public opinion impacts executive compensation. We show that...

Agency conflicts can arise when a fund manager also chairs the board of the fund. We examine the consequences of this fund manager duality using a broad sample of single managed US equity funds. We find that duality managers significantly underperform non-duality managers. This underperformance...

We investigate the abilities of buy-side analysts by analyzing nontraditional mutual funds that are exclusively managed by in-house analysts rather than traditional portfolio managers. Analysts exhibit stronger general and job-specific investment abilities than traditional managers from within...

We analyze what a second business degree reveals about the investment behavior of professional investors. Specifically, we compare performance, risk, and style of equity mutual fund managers having a CFA designation and an MBA degree to managers with only one of these qualifications. We document...

We study whether investors' demographic similarity to CEOs affects their investment decisions. Mutual fund managers are found to overweight firms led by CEOs who resemble them in terms of age, ethnicity and gender. This finding is robust to excluding educational and local ties and is supported...