A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some...

In light of the under-explored potential of Simon's theory of altruism, the purpose of the present article is to review this explanation of altruism and to point out some of its implications for behavioural economics and theories of economic organization. In the course of the argument, this...

This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within...

This chapter critically analyses contributions to evolutionary game theory by such writers as Robert Trivers, John Maynard-Smith, and Robert Axelrod. It develops four key arguments. First, that the behavioral propensities that manifest themselves in altruistic behavior are empirically relevant,...

This paper represents the third part of a research work dealing with the integration of economic efficiency and equity considered as a no-envy concept. Specifically, I examine here the problem of reduction of the malicious envy in a cultural evolutionary context. In fact, both in the case of...

In this paper we investigate the ways in which new forms of organization enabled by digital technologies such as crowdsourcing and digital marketplaces are allowing firms to circumvent and defy traditional knowledge constraints. This is part of the broader question of when and why these forms of...

We test how donors respond to new information about a charity's effectiveness. Freedom from Hunger implemented a test of its direct marketing solicitations, varying letters by whether they include a discussion of their program's impact as measured by scientific research. The base script, used...

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start of high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable...

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...