n this paper we examine the agency costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEO's within the FTSE 100 in the last decade. Are CEOs taking a large proportion of the total pot (a big "pay slice") more, or less, able to return value to shareholders by better management? In presenting this...

This study examined the relationship between the company-specific characteristics, namely, company size, company performance, and company leverage and the corporate governance attributes of a company which includes CEO duality and remuneration committee independence as the predictor factors that...

This study investigates the association between the compensation of Remuneration Committee Chairpersons (RCCs) and their characteristics. Utilizing data from firms listed on the UK FTSE350 index between 2010 and 2020, the research unveils that RCC remuneration is influenced by factors such as...

As it is widely believed that the behaviour of large Japanese companies is different from that of their British counterparts, hypothesises that the directors in both countries may have different financial incentives. The research estimates the determinants of executive compensation, using the...

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm...

We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK...