We analyze the adjustment of housing prices after an exogenous shock. Using continuous records of the housing market around a major European airport (ZRH, Switzerland) and an unexpected change in flight regulations induced by the neighboring country Germany, we find that apartment rents take...

We formulate an optimal control capital accumulation model with a Leontief-type production function and an exogenously given time-lag between investment and the accumulation of the capital stock, to analyze the qualitative and quantitative influence of time-lags on the system dynamics. As known...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage,...

We formulate an optimal control capital accumulation model with a Leontief-type production function and an exogenously given time-lag between investment and the accumulation of the capital stock, to analyze the qualitative and quantitative influence of time-lags on the system dynamics. As known...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a delegation problem in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents...