We consider an economy with two groups of individuals, rich and poor. A central authority can either directly redistribute income to the poor, or allow for some degree of informality in economic activities by not enforcing property rights. The optimal degree of informality depends upon the...

We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to formal sector in dual labor markets. Using a framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and politically dictated enforcement strategies, we show that firms which operate both in the formal and...

We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to formal sector in dual labor markets. We use a framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and politically dictated enforcement strategies. Firms which operate both in the formal and informal sectors do...

In many developing economies rate of unemployment is increasing with skill accumulation and thereby leading to underemployment. Our paper offers to look at skill formation as a demand side problem not as a traditional supply side problem and also how skill formation or education affects...

We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to formal sector in dual labor markets. We use a framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and politically dictated enforcement strategies. Firms which operate both in the formal and informal sectors do...

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively underdexplored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment is affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal...