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Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a spikeʺ in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897555
Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a "spike" in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers' behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003906298
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search e¤ort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408413
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001896163
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001900792
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001460511
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587042
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318597
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405528
This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a benefit sanction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261770