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The equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. In order to better analyze the consequence of such a rule, we need to account for the information asymmetry that exists between new controlling shareholders and outside investors with private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706677
takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and … consists of 51 firms in the U.S. oil industry from 1977 to 1994. Third, we employ ex ante measures of the threat of takeover at … the individual firm level which are superior to ex post measures like actual takeover occurrence or past incidence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012740763
We consider how much of the top end of the income distribution can be attributed to four sectors - top executives of non-financial firms (Main Street); financial service sector employees from investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); corporate lawyers;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726903
This paper reconciles three pronounced trends in U.S. corporate governance: the increase in pay levels for top executives, the increasing prevalence of appointing CEOs through external hiring rather than internal promotions, and the increased prevalence of hiring outside CEOs with prior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012730148
Between 1995 and 1998, actual growth in compensation per hour (CPH) accelerated from approximately 2 percent to 5 percent. Yet as the labor market continued to tighten in 1999, CPH growth unexpectedly slowed. This article explores whether this aggregate wage puzzle can be explained by changes in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012737680
This article is a response to Professor Yair Listokin's article: Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should be Compensated with Debt. In this response, I argue that the Professor Listokin's proposal is for empowering creditors' committees to bind all unsecured creditors to compensate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778077
This paper considers the regulation of executive pay practices in listed companies in the European Union and the empirical evidence of pay practices, based on the FTSE Eurotop 300 membership's annual report for 2001. The analysis is placed in the context of the dispersed ownership/blockholding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012785870
We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756516
On theoretical grounds, internal monitoring of top executives by the supervisory board is expected to result in positive abnormal returns subsequent to the announcement of their unanticipated forced departures. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012752660
We analyze and explore option fragility, the notion that option incentives are fragile due to their non-linear payoff structure. Option incentives become weaker as options fall underwater, leading to pressures to reprice options or restore incentives through additional grants of equity-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012740967