We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the...

Following extensive empirical evidence about quot;market anomaliesquot; and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention. However, all these models consider agents trading for their...

Following extensive empirical evidence about market anomalies and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention. However, all these models consider agents trading for their own account....

We use a controlled laboratory experiment with and without overlapping generations to study the emergence of public debt. Public debt is chosen by popular vote, pays for public goods, and is repaid with general taxes. With a single generation, public debt is accumulated prudently, never leading...

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (1987). In a 2x2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (1987). Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s (1987) conjecture that...

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (1987). In a 2x2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (1987). Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s (1987) conjecture that...

Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate...

Based on a serial supply chain model with 2-periods and price-sensitive demand, we present the first experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance. In theory, if holding costs are low enough, the buyer builds up a strategic inventory (even if no operational...

We introduce the give-or-destroy game that allows us to fully elicit an individual's social preference schedule. We find that about one third of the population exhibits both pro-social and anti-social preferences that are independent of payoff comparisons with those who are affected. We call...

We study a gift exchange game with 12 employees and one employer. When the employer can offer individually differentiated wages in a setting without collective action, we observe high levels of wages, effort choices, and total earnings. When the employer is restricted to offering a uniform wage,...