Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the constrained efficient allocations of endowment economies with imperfect risk sharing due to limited commitment can be decentralized as competitive equilibria with endogenous debt constraints that are not too tight. These are the loosest possible borrowing...

The implications of a context with household heterogeneity and incomplete financial markets have been mostly studied under the assumption that households own the physical capital and undertake the intertemporal investment decision. Further, firms rent capital and labor from the households to...

This paper studies the quantitative implications of a real business cycle model where the firm is the capital owner, households are heterogeneous, and markets are incomplete due to restricted asset trade. Since the usual firm objective is no longer well defined under these assumptions, several...

Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the constrained efficient allocations of endowment economies with complete markets and limited commitment can be decentralized with endogenous borrowing limits on the Arrow securities. In a model with capital accumulation, aggregate risk and competitive...

Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the constrained efficient allocations of endowment economies with imperfect risk sharing due to limited commitment can be decentralized as competitive equilibria with endogenous debt constraints that are not too tight. These are the loosest possible borrowing...