"This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

We exploit the random assignment of judges in personal bankruptcy proceedings to test whether race and politics bias judges granting debt discharges in chapter 13 (reorganization) and chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy proceedings. To do so, we have collected a random sample of 9,526 bankruptcy...

This paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-markets perspective on the financial policies that triggered the Asian financial crisis. The agency-cost analysis hypothesizes that individual-country regulators knew that politically directed loans had made their banks insolvent, but...

In this paper, we empirically assess the role of individual social capital on personal bankruptcy and default outcomes in the consumer credit market. After controlling for a borrower's risk score, debt, income, wealth, and legal and economic environments, we find that default/bankruptcy risk...