CEO narcissism affects the M&A process. More narcissistic target CEOs obtain higher bid premiums. Acquirer shareholders react less favorably to a takeover announcement when the target CEO is more narcissistic. Among acquiring CEOs, narcissism is associated with initiating deals and negotiating...

We examine how managerial incentives affect acquisition decisions in the banking industry. We find that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) leads to value-enhancing acquisitions. Banks whose CEOs have higher PPS have significantly better abnormal stock returns around the acquisition...

Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003-2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look at...

Recent surveys show that 24% of independent directors in Russel 3,000 firms have continuously served on their boards for fifteen years or more. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2012, we document strong positive effects on financial performance for firms with one, very...

We examine the impact of the social attachment through age similarity between the independent directors and the CEO on earnings management. Using changes in independent director composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that firms with the presence of the...

Prior literature examines the matching of firm-types with board composition, but very little research focuses on the matching of CEO types with directors' skill sets. We examine whether a gender-diverse board helps to mitigate the negative impacts of overconfident managers, thus improving firm...

We argue gender-diverse boards are associated with distinct preferences that reassure investors about their commitment to moderate risk and boost long-term corporate survival. Results suggest a strong relation between gender-diverse boards and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components,...

This paper examines one type of failure in the governance system, the case where directors do not protect shareholders from securities fraud. We study the breakdown of the agency relationship in which shareholders not only sue the company, but also name the directors. We find that naming...