This paper studies the problem of a monopolistic platform which offers agents connection with one another. Agents have heterogeneous characteristics that are valued by some other agents and observed privately by the principal. The agents are privately informed about their heterogeneous...

This paper studies the problem of a monopolistic platform which offers agents connection with one another. Agents have heterogeneous characteristics that are valued by some other agents and observed privately by the principal. The agents are privately informed about their heterogeneous...

This paper studies the problem of a monopolist who sells a network good through a price posting scheme. The scheme posts a price of every possible allocation for each buyer, who are then asked to report their private information to the seller. The seller then implements the allocation based on...

A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield benefits only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by controlling the...

This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents’ effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents’ effort incentive through the use of a feedback...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions of the downstream...

This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can also choose the timing of a trade with each buyer endowed with private information about the seller’s good. A buyer’s valuation of the good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers’ private signals, and is affected by the...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the...

In this paper we analyse a common agency model in which agents can choose with how many principals they want to work for, while principals cannot condition contracts on the agent's decision to accept other contracts. In this case of "non-intrinsic" common agency we characterise the equilibrium....