. Will such markets aggregate information? Will the superior firm necessarily prevail? We adapt the classical social learning … model by introducing strategic dynamic pricing. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for learning. In contrast to … previous results, learning can occur when signals are bounded. This happens when signals exhibit the newly introduced vanishing …

observation allows us to identify a local learning requirement, a natural condition on the agent's neighborhood that guarantees … learning requirement by constructing a family of social networks that guarantee information aggregation despite that no agent … is a social hub (in other words, there are no opinion leaders). Although the common wisdom of the social learning …

This paper provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an $m …

We study a canonical setting of learning in networks where initially agents receive conditionally i.i.d. signals about …. Our goal is to design simple non-Bayesian learning heuristics that succeed to robustly learn the correct state for a wide …

This paper provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an m …

DeGroot rule, then actions converge to the state (in probability), i.e., \emph{asymptotic learning}, in any informative …

social-learning model by introducing strategic dynamic pricing. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic … learning. In contrast to previous results, we show that asymptotic learning can occur when signals are bounded, namely, happens …