We employ a stochastic dynamic programming approach to study decision making by an individual wishing to have an arranged marriage. First, we show that this individual never opts out of a voluntarily agreed upon marriage. Second, we demonstrate that our marrying individual uses a reservation...

Recently, Batabyal (2005) has analyzed a game model of dowry determination in which a mediator plays a key role. Batabyal's analysis shows that the equilibrium dowry offers from the bride and the groom optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that this offer...

Even though arranged marriages have been around for quite some time, economists have paid little attention to the nature of decision making in such marriages. Therefore, we know very little about the efficacy of traditional methods of decision making in arranged marriages. Given this state of...

It is now common for parents and relatives of an individual seeking to have an arranged marriage to set up one or more meetings between this individual and prospective spouses. As a result of these meetings, prospective spouses get exposed to this marrying individual. Even though this exposure...

Even though arranged marriages have been around for quite a while, the economics literature has paid scant attention to the nature of decision making in such marriages. Consequently, very little is known about the effects of alternate decision rules on the spouse selection question in arranged...

Although arranged and love marriages have been around for a long time, to the best of our knowledge, there are no comparative analyses in the economics literature of the relative merits of one or the other kind of marriage. As such, the purpose of this note is to conduct a theoretical inquiry...

The notion of a reservation quality or utility is a key feature of Batabyal's (2003a) recent analysis of decision making in arranged marriages. In this model, the magnitude of the reservation utility has a non-trivial impact on the decision to accept or decline a marriage proposal. Even so,...

Let a society’s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when...

Let a society’s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when...

Let a society’s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when...