Financial institutions form multi-layer networks of contracts among each other and exposures to common assets. As a result, the default probability of one institution depends on the default probability of all the other institutions in the network. Here, we show how small errors on the knowledge...

The practice of lobbying in the interest of economic or social groups plays an important role in the policy making process of most economies. We carry out a multi-level network analysis of the relations among lobbying organizations in the EU transparency register, focusing on the domain of...

We examine how trade sanctions can be imposed effectively in a trading network. We focus on three factors that affect trade sanctions: a country’s endowment, distance between trading countries, and connectivity in the network. Our models explain several empirical observations: (i) sanctions...

In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do...

We study the formation of multilayer networks where payoffs are determined by the degrees in each network and explore distinct network relationships by allowing for inter-network and intra-network spillovers through five properties: supermodularity and submodularity for internetwork spillovers,...

We introduce a general model for the balance-sheet consistent valuation of interbank claims within an interconnected financial system. Our model represents an extension of clearing models of interdependent liabilities to account for the presence of uncertainty on banks' external assets. At the...

This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow or directed network models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in...

We consider a model of an information network where nodes can fail and transmission of information is costly. The formation of paths in such networks is modeled as the Nash equilibrium of an N player routing game. The task of obtaining this equilibrium is shown to be NP-Hard. We derive...

We characterize the evolution over time of a network of credit relations among financial agents as a system of coupled stochastic processes. Each process describes the dynamics of individual financial robustness, while the coupling results from a network of liabilities among agents. The average...