In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do...

We analyse time series of CDS spreads for a set of major US and European institutions on a period overlapping the recent financial crisis. We extend the existing methodology of drawdowns to the one of joint drawups, in order to estimate the conditional probabilities of abrupt co-movements among...

We introduce a general model for the balance-sheet consistent valuation of interbank claims within an interconnected financial system. Our model represents an extension of clearing models of interdependent liabilities to account for the presence of uncertainty on banks' external assets. At the...

The practice of lobbying in the interest of economic or social groups plays an important role in the policy making process of most economies. We carry out a multi-level network analysis of the relations among lobbying organizations in the EU transparency register, focusing on the domain of...

We examine how trade sanctions can be imposed effectively in a trading network. We focus on three factors that affect trade sanctions: a country’s endowment, distance between trading countries, and connectivity in the network. Our models explain several empirical observations: (i) sanctions...

This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow or directed network models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in...

We consider a model of an information network where nodes can fail and transmission of information is costly. The formation of paths in such networks is modeled as the Nash equilibrium of an N player routing game. The task of obtaining this equilibrium is shown to be NP-Hard. We derive...