European Union (EU) countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory and supervisory integration, complementing various other European integration efforts following the Second World War. Financial regulatory and supervisory integration was a very slow process before 2008, despite...

We analyze the benefits and costs of a non-euro country opting-in to the banking union. The decision to opt-in depends on the comparison between the assessment of the banking union attractiveness and the robustness of a national safety net. The benefits of opting-in are still only potential and...

The handling of cross-border banks in difficulties gives rise to coordination problems between home and host countries. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006, 2009) have suggested to implement an ex ante burden sharing mechanism to overcome the co-ordination failure of national authorities. While...

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European-level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national...

Both theory (game theory) and practice (recent financial crisis) indicate that national interests prevail in cross-border resolution. National authorities aim for the least-cost solution for domestic taxpayers. This results in an undersupply of the public good of global financial stability....

Since the European Council of June 2012, ‘Banking Union' is a key item for the EU's policy agenda. This contribution outlines the state of the policy debate – identifying the elements that are missing but important from a theoretical viewpoint. We make concrete proposals as to how the...