cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences …

cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate problem is not … empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …