Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 383
Cover Image
A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi - 2001
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
Cover Image
Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726
Cover Image
Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953 - 2003
Serrano, Roberto - 2004
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959
Cover Image
A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation
Lazarova, Emiliya A. - 2006
A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733871
Cover Image
Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
Cover Image
Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
Cover Image
Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program : Time for Retirement?
Serrano, Roberto - 2020
The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for retirement, as it is full of energy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826588
Cover Image
Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?
Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48
The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895
Cover Image
Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003
Serrano, Roberto - 2005
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064861
Cover Image
Characterizing the core via k-core covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779