uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …

merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …

. Moreover, we prove that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a related concave fixed tree game. We show how to … find the nucleolus, and we characterize the orders which provide marginal vectors in the core of an FRP game …

We show that neither Peleg's nor Tadenuma's well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual … balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative …

cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex … value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of …

shown that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided …

-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …

It is known that for supermodular TU-games, the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains …, obtained by minimizing or maximizing in a given order the coordinates of a core element. We give a simple formula which does …, and show that there exist balanced games whose core has vertices which are not min-max vertices if and only if n > 4 …