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The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181798
of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957744
We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014146018
It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility … is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on … totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147814
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087342
This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729181
costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on … associated games do not occur. The main axioms for the core and the nucleolus are consistency properties based on the reduced …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019777
theoretic perspective. A corresponding preparation sequencing game is defined and the focus is on the core and nucleolus of such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196913
It is known that for supermodular TU-games, the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains …, obtained by minimizing or maximizing in a given order the coordinates of a core element. We give a simple formula which does …, and show that there exist balanced games whose core has vertices which are not min-max vertices if and only if n > 4 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984412
In this paper, we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable … based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized. The relation between core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029219