Showing 1 - 10 of 18
A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733871
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190658
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342576
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722635
To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130233
-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071904
-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601129
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191203