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The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2008

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377055

Two values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713

Characterizations of Network Power Measures

van den Brink, René; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - 2005

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263

An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games

Brink, René van den; Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, … - 2011

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication graph the total payoff to the players of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386146

The V L Value for Network Games

Hendrickx, Ruud; Borm, Peter; van den Brink, René; … - 2005

In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games. This value turns out to have a nice interpretation. We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064942

Cooperative games in graph structure

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2000

of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860

On the extreme points of two polytopes associated with a digraph and applications to cooperative games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2004

In this paper we describe the extreme points of two closely related polytopes that are assigned to a digraph. The first polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that each node gets at least as much as each of its successors. The second one is the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335203

A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722639

Centrality rewarding shapley and Myerson values for undirected graph games

Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - 2016

In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120

On Heterogeneous Covert Networks

Lindelauf, Roy H. A.; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert - 2008

Covert organizations are constantly faced with a tradeoff between secrecy and operational effciency. Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers (2008) developed a theoretical framework to determine optimal homogeneous networks taking the above mentioned considerations explicitly into account. In this paper this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218001