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The restricted core for totally positive games with ordered players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2009
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378242
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The Harsanyi set for cooperative TU-games
Vasilʹev, Valerij A.; Laan, Gerard van der - 2001
Harsanyi set is related to the Core and Weberset. We also characterize the Harsanyi mapping as the unique mappingsatisfying a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313932
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Axiomatizations of two types of shapley values for games on union closed systems
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2009
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378792
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Two values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
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Interactive Purchasing Situations
Borm, Peter - 2012
, it is shown that a decreasing unit price function is a sufficient condition for a non-empty core: the Direct Price … solution is both a core element and a marginal vector. It is seen that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107420
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From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2015
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
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An owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures
Brink, René van den; Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, … - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190658
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Distributing dividends in games with ordered players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2006
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350374
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The V L Value for Network Games
Hendrickx, Ruud; Borm, Peter; van den Brink, René; … - 2005
In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games. This value turns out to have a nice interpretation. We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064942
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Three-valued simple games
Musegaas, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350040