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Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2000

of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860

Congestion Network Problems and Related Games

Quant, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Reijnierse, Hans - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

that for network problems with convex congestion costs, the corresponding games have a non-empty core.If congestion costs … are concave, then the corresponding game has not necessarily core elements, but it is derived that, contrary to the convex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092232

Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure

Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255446

The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

Borm, Peter; Ruys, Pieter H.M.; Ju, Y. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092734

Characterizations of Solutions in Digraph Competitions

Quant, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Reijnierse, Hans; … - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

The T -measure is introduces as a method to rank the nodes in a digraph competition.It coincides with the T -value of an associated transferable utility game, the so-called digraph game.The T -measure is characterized in two ways.One of them is based on a characterization of the T -value in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092926

A Note on the Balancedness and the Concavity of Highway Games

Borm, Peter; Ciftci, B.B.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

A highway problem is determined by a connected graph which provides all potential entry and exit vertices and all possible edges that can be constructed between vertices, a cost function on the edges of the graph and a set of players, each in need of constructing a connection between a specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090618

Inventory Games

Borm, Peter; Meca-Martinez, A.; Timmer, J.B.; … - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

AMS classifications: 90D12, 90B05.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090632

On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games

Borm, Peter; Calleja, P.; Hamers, H.J.M.; Klijn, F. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2001

This paper considers a special class of sequencing situations with two parallel machines in which each agent has precisely two jobs to be processed, one on each machine.The costs of an agent depend linearly on the final completion time of his jobs.We describe a procedure that provides an optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090749

Linear Transformation of Products : Games and Economies

Borm, Peter; Timmer, J.B.; Suijs, J.P.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

AMS classifications: 90A15, 90D12.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091669

Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games

Borm, Peter; Ciftci, B.B.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006

A path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path.A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player's payoff does not decrease as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091740