competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by … incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability trade-off is characterized and the … implications of the analysis for regulation and competition policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on …

competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by … incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability trade-off is characterized and the … implications of the analysis for regulation and competition policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on …

competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by … incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability trade-off is characterized and the … implications of the analysis for regulation and competition policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on …

opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket … guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank …

interventions aimed at alleviating the bank capital crunch. We find that the growth of firms dependent on external financing is … disproportionately positively affected by bank recapitalization policies, and that this effect is quantitatively important and robust to …