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-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases the acquirer's capacity to raise outside funds to finance the takeover. Absent effective … effective competition, the increased outside funding capacity makes it less likely that the takeover outcome is determined by … ability to create value. Accordingly, stronger legal investor protection can improve the efficiency of the takeover outcome …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125194
restructuring firms directly. Such takeover activism should record superior returns as its opportunity cost includes the foregone …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856282
This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investor protection increases bidders' outside funding capacity. However, absent effective bidding competition,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079580
We study when firms choose to install boards and their roles in a historical setting where neither boards nor their duties are mandated by law. Boards arise in firms with large, heterogenous shareholder bases. We propose that an important role of boards is to mediate between heterogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219462
We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects the manner in which activist funds govern as blockholders. In particular, funds inflate short-term performance by increasing payouts financed by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857173
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because of this latter e¤ect and its repercussion on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071555
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009357279
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010236189
-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases the acquirer's capacity to raise outside funds to finance the takeover. Absent effective … effective competition, the increased outside funding capacity makes it less likely that the takeover outcome is determined by … to create value. Accordingly, stronger legal investor protection can improve the efficiency of the takeover outcome …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125583
incorporate financing constraints and legal investor protection into a standard takeover model. In the model, stronger legal … provides a novel rationale for the optimality of “one hare-one vote,” shows that margin requirements impair takeover efficiency … while shadow costs of internal funds improve it, and makes empirical predictions relating the takeover outcome to, e …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092891