the absence of central bank intervention, the incentive of financial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good … states may result in excessively low liquidity in bad states. In the prevailing mixed-strategy equilibrium, depositors are … worse off than if banks would coordinate on more liquid investment. It is shown that public provision of liquidity improves …

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing …, 2008), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback … between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available …

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing …, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback … between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available …

pure illiquidity risk. It is shown that, when bad states are highly unlikely, public provision of liquidity may improve the … an incentive of financial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good states, resulting in excessively low liquidity … more liquid investment. In that case, liquidity injection will make the free riding problem even worse. The results show …

liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage … extra cost for banking regulation and makes some schemes that are optimal under pure illiquidity risks (such as liquidity …