The paper develops a theoretical framework, and a diagrammatic apparatus, for explaining the supply of child labour. It examines the effect of credit, insurance, and poverty (defined as more than just low income). It also explains bonded child labour, a modern form of slavery closely associated...

There is no empirical evidence that trade exposure per se increases child labour. As trade theory and household economics lead us to expect, the cross-country evidence seems to indicate that trade reduces or, at worst, has no significant effect on child labour. Consistently with the theory, a...

Decisions concerning marriage, fertility, participation, and the education of children are explained using a two-stage game-theoretical model. The paper examines the effects of (i) family law (cost of obtaining a divorce, alimony, availability of quasi-marriages such as PACS in France, and civil...

Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income,...

As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and...

Incorporating family decisions in a two-period.model of the world economy, we predict that trade liberalization raises the skill premium and reduces child labour in developing countries where the adult labour force is sufficiently well educated to attract production activities from abroad that...