What are the pros and cons of involving external auditors in banking supervision? This paper investigates the relationship between banking supervision and the involvement of external auditors from a theoretical and empirical perspective. We first provide a simple principal-agent framework that...

We empirically investigate whether central bank independence (CBI) and the monetary policy setting can jointly influence the likelihood that policymakers assign banking supervision to central banks. We find that, conditional on the government being a benevolent one, higher central bank...

In this paper we model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...

By the early ‘2000 an increasing numbers of countries had adopted a well defined central bank framework, which is characterized by two intertwined features: the authority becomes specialized in achieving the monetary policy goals, and consequently its traditional responsibilities in pursuing...

The ongoing global financial crisis is rooted in a combination of factors common to previous financial crises and some new factors. The crisis has brought to light a number of deficiencies in financial regulation and architecture, particularly in the treatment of systemically important financial...

We investigate the reasons that induce policymakers to assign banking supervision to central banks rather than involving authorities outside the banking sector. On the one hand, empirical results provide evidence that policymakers prefer that, conditional on several known features affecting...