The handling of cross-border banks in difficulties gives rise to coordination problems between home and host countries. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006, 2009) have suggested to implement an ex ante burden sharing mechanism to overcome the co-ordination failure of national authorities. While...

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European-level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national...

The Global Financial Crisis has shown that the international financial system is vulnerable to breakdown. The financial trilemma demonstrates that financial stability, international banking and national financial supervision cannot be combined. National supervisors force international banks to...

Both theory (game theory) and practice (recent financial crisis) indicate that national interests prevail in cross-border resolution. National authorities aim for the least-cost solution for domestic taxpayers. This results in an undersupply of the public good of global financial stability....

Since the European Council of June 2012, ‘Banking Union' is a key item for the EU's policy agenda. This contribution outlines the state of the policy debate – identifying the elements that are missing but important from a theoretical viewpoint. We make concrete proposals as to how the...

Banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Expanding the geographic footprint of an organization's profit-making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the...