On June 4-5, 2014, SUERF and Baffi Finlawmetrics jointly organised a Colloquium/Conference “Money, Regulation and Growth: Financing New Growth in Europe” at Bocconi University, Milan. The present SUERF Study includes a selection of papers based on the authors’ contributions to the Milan...

A firm has liabilities towards a group of creditors. We analyze the question of how to distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory literature, we introduce the firm as an explicit player and...

In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such...