We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading,...

We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading,...

Section I: The Broad Picture1 Is the European Union going to help us overcome the COVID-19 crisis (Danny Busch)2 COVID-19 and European banks: no time for lawyers (Wolf-Georg Ringe)3 The COVID-19 crisis and financial regulation (Eddy Wymeersch)4 Culutral reforms in Irish banks. Walking the walk...

After the COVID-19 crisis struck, equity prices abruptly plunged across the world. The clear prospect of an almost unprecedented decrease in supply and demand, coupled with extreme uncertainty about the longer-term prospects for the economy worldwide, justified the price adjustments. Yet, in...

The pandemic crisis, which broke out in early 2020, is still affecting human lives and economic activity around the globe, causing unprecedented transformations which were not foreseen just before its onset. The European Union, its citizens and the financial and non-financial firms active...

We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading,...

We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model...

This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...

If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a quot;poison pillquot; by signing generous long-term labor contracts and thereby...

The paper analyzes the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that, in some circumstances, entrepreneurs and workers agree to trade low investor protection for high employment protection. The feasibility of this quot;corporatistquot; agreement depends on...