Showing 1 - 10 of 33
We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535527
What determines people's moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people's normative views in trust and gift exchange games, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance, are themselves functions of positive emotions. We used experimental survey methods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771743
What determines people's moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people's normative views in trust and gift exchange games, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance, are themselves functions of positive emotions. We used experimental survey methods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078831
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009777651
social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490199
predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009419533
We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team allocator games are intended to capture natural asymmetries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012498512
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012137180
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126333
We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team allocator games are intended to capture natural asymmetries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507353